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Nearly two weeks after the armed uprising began in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas, the
events in that region continue to grip national and international attention. For now, a massive
offensive by the Mexican army has forced the estimated 1,000 rebels from the Zapatista National
Liberation Army (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, EZLN) to retreat into the mountainous
jungles which hug the border with Guatemala, leading to a lull in the fighting.
Nevertheless, repercussions from the rebellion continue to multiply. Among other things, the
uprising has focused a public spotlight on the issues of extreme poverty in southern Mexico, and on
the economic inequities which exist throughout the country, forcing President Salinas de Gortari's
administration to address those issues.

Economic repercussions of the rebellion
According to Jeffrey Rubin, a fellow at the Center for US-Mexican Studies at the University of
California San Diego, economic conditions provided fertile ground for the uprising in Chiapas,
which began on Jan. 1.
"In Chiapas, the intensification of profitable logging and livestock enterprises in the 1980s, which
will accelerate under the North American Free Trade Agreement, made it harder and harder for the
already poor people to survive," Rubin wrote in an opinion piece published in the New York Times
on Jan. 7.
Rubin said the situation in Chiapas was further aggravated by the collapse of world coffee prices,
which resulted in a drop in income for small-scale coffee producers in Chiapas. To date, the
National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, PRONASOL) which has achieved
some success through its sponsorship of development projects in impoverished parts of the country
has nevertheless done little to ease extreme poverty in Chiapas or most other regions of Mexico.
According to some estimates, for example, the PRONASOL budget for Chiapas during 1993
amounted to only about US$60 million. As a result, most economic analysts predict the unrest in
Chiapas will force President Salinas to implement significant changes in his economic policies
during the final months of his administration, including an increase in expenditures for social
development and anti-poverty programs. Salinas's term in office expires in December of this year,
following elections which are scheduled for Aug. 21.
The cornerstones of Salinas's economic policies over the past five years low inflation, privatization of
government properties, and negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with
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the US and Canada were intended to attract foreign capital to Mexico and forge a partnership with
the private sector to spur economic recovery. To achieve low inflation, Salinas limited government
spending, and negotiated agreements with labor unions, the business sector, and agricultural
organizations to freeze wage increases and consumer prices.
But the administration which made no secret of its pride in having achieved a budget surplus in 1993
will now have to open its purse strings, funnelling resources to the most poverty—stricken parts of
the country. In October 1993, the Salinas administration had announced plans to channel funds from
the 1993 budget surplus toward social programs, especially to subsidize salary increases for workers
on the bottom end of the pay scale (SourceMex, Oct. 6, 1993).
That same month, Salinas also announced an increase of 33% in crop subsidies, via a new
agricultural support program (Programa de Apoyos Directos a la Agricultura, Procampo), bringing
total expenditures on agriculture supports to US$3.75 billion (SourceMex, Oct. 27, 1993). Even with
these increased expenditures, the administration planned for a balanced budget in 1994, not a
budget deficit.
But economic analysts now predict the government will have to spend far more than had been
foreseen on much-needed programs in areas such as health, housing, and education, resulting in a
budget deficit of 1% to 2.5% of GDP for 1994. Meanwhile, the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV), one
barometer of how the Mexican financial sector views the unrest, has experienced wide swings over
the past two weeks.
Twice on Jan. 3 and Jan. 10 the BMV recorded its greatest one-day losses, but both times it
rebounded in subsequent trading, even to record highs.
The events in Chiapas have begun to have international repercussions as well. According to analyst
Guillermo Estebanez of Moody's Investor Services, the chances for Mexican bonds to receive an
"investment grade" this year have diminished greatly in the wake of the unrest in Chiapas.
According to Estebanez, his company will retain a lower rating of "Ba2" for Mexican bonds. "The
[Ba2] rating in a way was designed to alert people to the kind of problems which lie behind the
Chiapas unrest," Estebanez told the New York Times.

Political fallout from the conflict
While there is widespread agreement on the need to address the economic roots of the conflict,
many analysts say that political factors were also a major cause behind the uprising. "Without
political reform, any attempts at economic reform remain fragile, even illusory," said novelist and
political commentator Carlos Fuentes. "The Mexican elite must realize that we still suffer many of
the problems prevalent in the Third World."
In fact, the upcoming electoral campaign creates a sense of urgency for the Salinas administration
and the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which has governed the country for the past 65
years to shore up the candidacy of presidential hopeful Luis Donaldo Colosio.
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During a campaign stop in Hidalgo state on Jan. 10, Colosio promised that if elected his
administration would attempt to address the issue of economic inequality. "[Chiapas] is a call
that speaks to us of the urgency of greater social justice," said Colosio, who held the post of Social
Development Secretary before accepting the PRI nomination.
As part of the government's strategy to put down the rebellion, Salinas implemented the second
major cabinet reshuffle in less than two months. The most significant change was the removal of
Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido from the post of Interior (Gobernacion) Secretary. He was replaced
by Attorney General Jorge Carpizo McGregor, who at one time led the National Human Rights
Commission (Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH).
Gonzalez Garrido had been widely criticized for tolerating human rights abuses and ignoring the
widespread poverty and marginalization of Indians during his term as governor of Chiapas, a post
he left a year ago. In addition, former Mexico City Mayor Manuel Camacho Solis, who in November
had been assigned to the post of foreign minister, relinquished that position on Jan. 10 to become
Mexico's special "Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas."
Camacho, known for his skills as a negotiator, was replaced as foreign minister by Manuel Tello
Macias, Mexico's ambassador to France. According to prominent political columnist Sergio
Sarmiento, the focus on poverty and income distribution in Mexico is likely to benefit Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas, presidential candidate of the opposition Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). "Clearly this
is going to help the opposition, especially the PRD," he said. "They can use this as a political weapon
and they have begun to do so." The PRD condemned violent actions taken by the EZLN, but it also
took the opportunity to criticize recent PRI administrations for having fostered the conditions that
sparked the rebel uprising.
Sarmiento suggested the PRI may emerge from the crisis with few scars if the fighting ends quickly
and the government has the opportunity to look magnanimous in victory. Conversely, "it would be
to the PRD's advantage if these people went into the jungle and made sporadic attacks, or if there
was evidence of strong human rights violations" by the army in putting down the revolt, Sarmiento
said.

Conflict extends beyond Chiapas
For their part, in written statements and in interviews granted to Mexican reporters, members of
the EZLN have characterized the uprising as an effort to focus attention on the plight of the poor
in Mexico, especially the Mayan indigenous groups which constitute a majority of the population
in Chiapas. In a communique released in early January, the EZLN urged the government to take
such steps as forcing banks to cancel overdue debt for coffee and cattle producers in Chiapas, to
redefine agricultural policies in order to provide more direct assistance to small-scale producers,
and to create regional economic development centers.
One rebel leader who identified himself as "Mariano" told Excelsior newspaper that the Zapatistas
had been preparing for over a decade. "Our army was formed in 1983, and in the past 10 years we
structured it to have a military organization not of the bourgeoisie, but of the people," Mariano said.
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"We have been waiting too many years for answers to our problems, too many years of poverty and
ignorance," he added.
Beginning on Jan. 7, the EZLN and groups expressing solidarity with their cause such as the
clandestine Partido Revolucionario Obrero Clandestino Union del Pacifico (PROCUP)- -followed
through on threats to expand the uprising outside of Chiapas. Rebels launched actions such as
toppling electrical towers in Puebla and Michoacan and damaging an electrical facility in Mexico
state; detonating a car bomb at a shopping center in Mexico City; and launching a grenade attack on
an empty federal government building in Acapulco.
In addition, a van loaded with explosives was detonated near a military base in Mexico state. All
the attacks resulted in minimal damage and only minor injuries. Additional security measures were
adopted nationwide after the bombings in Mexico City and Acapulco over the Jan. 8-9 weekend.
These included requiring all visitors to public buildings in Mexico City to register at a reception
desk, and an increase in police patrols on city streets, subways, and other crowded gathering places.
According to daily newspaper Excelsior, 80,000 police officers were placed on alert in Mexico City
and adjacent Mexico state. Meanwhile, as part of its efforts to win the battle for public opinion,
the Salinas administration has forcefully insisted that foreigners are ultimately responsible for the
uprising. The government says the EZLN leadership is comprised mostly of Central Americans with
experience in guerrilla warfare, particularly Guatemalans and Salvadorans. In fact, on Jan. 9, the
Attorney General's Office (PGR) announced the arrest of a Guatemalan citizen in nearby Tabasco
state. The suspect was described as one of the EZLN's principal field commanders. The previous
day, the government had announced that 30 guerrillas who were arrested had "confessed" that
the movement was led by two Guatemalans. The EZLN has vehemently denied the presence of
foreigners among its ranks, while the Guatemalan rebels and former Salvadoran rebels have both
rejected any links to the EZLN. Meanwhile, as part of the massive military offensive launched to
put down the uprising which included 15,000 troops backed by air support and tanks the Mexican
armed forces imposed tight restrictions on access for journalists and human rights observers to the
conflict areas. The limited access to the area has fueled charges that the Mexican army is committing
massive human rights abuses against the local population as it attempts to crush the rebels. In fact,
US human rights activists who conducted a brief fact-finding trip to Mexico told reporters in New
York that the army was abducting and executing area residents. Three of the activists said they
found evidence of mass graves and cremation, attacks by the army on Red Cross personnel, and
torture of rebel prisoners and civilians.
The allegations have attracted the attention of US officials, who have expressed their concerns
directly to the Salinas administration. "Published reports of summary executions of rebels are
extremely disturbing, not only because they constitute a violation of human rights, but also because
they invite a similarly violent response from the rebels," said US Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ).
Torricelli also urged Salinas to avoid arbitrary arrests and detentions, indiscriminate bombings of
populated areas where rebels are thought to be located, and attacks against journalists. I
n his New York Times opinion piece, Jeffrey Rubin suggested that the long-standing human rights
violations in Chiapas may be a cause, rather than a symptom, of the uprising. "Preoccupied with
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furthering the free trade agenda (and with convincing other nations that ordinary Mexicans support
NAFTA), the authorities failed to address local grievances, disrupted political meetings, and jailed
and tortured peasant leaders," Rubin said.

-- End --
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